Electrical Engineer Julio Hildebrand is part of the Lahmeyer team advising Sudanese Hydro Generation Company Ltd (SHGC) on the dam’s rehabilitation and uprating. Discover the project from Julio’s perspective. Planning in the Blue Nile, Discussion Paper Series 13-05, Environment for Development, 2013. used a stochastic dual dynamic programming approach within a hydro-economic framework to optimize operations for the benefits of hydropower and agriculture pro- duction under various build-out scenarios.
Its initial task was to provide water supply for irrigation and flood control. Later a power house with generating units was included. The first task with my involvement was a trip in November 2017 for a visit to the plant. Ethiopia has proposed different plans and conducted studies for dam projects on the Blue Nile, but the storage capacity required for such large dams is much higher than the capability of the Blue. Ethiopia unilaterally announced its plan to build the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile at the very same location of the Border Dam.
The theoretical benchmark for basin 516 cooperation in the agricultural and power sector (basin_MS scenario) generates the lowest annual 517 national costs only for Uzbekistan. The “New Roseires” hydropower plant in Sudan will in the future provide to the country an important expansion in power generation capacity, enough for supplying electricity to thousands of additional homes, as well as public infrastructure (e.g. hospitals). This will significantly increase the quality of living of the Sudanese population.
Thursday, September 28, 2006
Cooperative game theory concepts that address relative power of the riparian states in capturing incremental benefits from cooperation, such as the Core, the Shapley Value, and the Nash-Harsanyi (N-H) solution are compared under several scenarios, namely with and without water trade, and with and without existence of unidirectional externalities in the form of soil erosion and siltation impact. We find that the stability of Shapley and N-H benefits allocations are sensitive to the initial water rights allocation, which may explain the present caution of the basin states to be engaged in cooperation arrangements. We also find that when a Core exists it is very small, which indicates also a fragile basis for cooperation. This study examines management approaches for hydropower generation and irrigation and domestic water supply for the Tekeze-Atbara, a transboundary river between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan, in above- and below-normal hydrologic conditions, considering current and future water demand scenarios.
Cooperative game theory offers useful insights for assessing cooperative solutions for water conflicts in international river basins. Applying cooperative game theory concepts such as core, nucleolus, and Shapley value to Nile water conflicts, we examine the incentive structure of both cooperative and noncooperative strategies for different riparian countries and establish some baseline conditions for incentive-compatible cooperation in the Nile basin. and natural resources.
Arjoon et al. (2014) , Tilmant and Kinzelbach 38 (2012) and Whittington et al. (2005) assessed the value of cooperation in international river basins 39 and found that there are significant gains from basin-wide cooperation. The equity issue of sharing 40 benefits from cooperation has been addressed by game theory (Teasley and McKinney 2011;Wu 41 and Whittington 2006) and an approach based on a stakeholder vision of fairness ( Arjoon et al. 42 2016).
evaluated the longterm impacts of the GERD on the economic benefits of Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt and concluded that the GERD would increase the minimum annual economic benefits of the three countries from 4.9 to 5.6 billion US$, provided that Sudan fully uses its water share according to the 1959Nile Water Agreement (UN, 1964 and Ethiopia implements its planned irrigation schemes around Lake Tana. Similarly, Jeuland et al. (2017) examined the long-term impacts of the GERD on Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt and found that by maximizing the overall economic benefit of the three countries, the annual economic benefit to Ethiopia would increase from 253 to 1465 million US$ primarily due to hydroenergy generation, but the annual economic benefit to Sudan would decrease from 1691 to 1595 million US$ as a result of allowing the maximum generation of energy from all Nile dams and promoting downstream agricultural production in Egypt. In October 2017, I was invited to join the Lahmeyer team assigned in the project of the rehabilitation and uprating of Roseires HPP. The Hydropower Plant is located at the Blue Nile river, about 550 km south of Khartoum, close to the city of Ad-Damazin. The dam was constructed between 1961 and 1966.
In this paper, we suggest a methodology to assess the distributional aspects of various water allocation schemes applied to the Blue Nile in Africa. Based on previous analysis, a social planner allocation is found superior to the existing status quo in that it is inclusive, and expands the net benefit frontier of the basin. Water trade is introduced to demonstrate that such institution can alleviate the performance of existing institutions associated with the status quo and enable cooperation.
With the proposed benefit-sharing mechanism, the efficiency-equity trade-off still exists, but the extent of the imbalance is reduced because benefits are maximized and redistributed according to a key that has been collectively agreed upon by the participants. The whole system is overseen by a river basin authority.
For example, some of the planned irrigation schemes in upstream countries are not economically sound if the power stations that are in an advanced planning phase are implemented. This study also reveals that the economic value of the three largest storage infrastructure (Kariba, Itezhitezhi, Cahora Bassa) is around US$443 million/year.